A new logic of belief (in the "Only knowing" family) with confidence levels is presented. The logic allows a natural distinction between explicit and implicit belief representations, where the explicit form directly expresses its models. The explicit form can be found by applying a set of equivalence preserving rewriting rules to the implicit form. The rewriting process is performed entirely within the logic, on the object level, provided we supply an explicit formalization of the logical space. We prove that the problem of deciding whether there exists a consistent explicit form is Σ p 2 -complete, a complexity class to which many problems of nonmonotonic reasoning belong. The article also contains a conceptual analysis of basic notions in this paper like belief, co-belief and degrees of confidence.
Introduction
This article presents the propositional modal logic AE, a logic in the "Only knowing" family of logical systems pioneered by Levesque [11] . Compared to other propositional systems in this family the AE system contributes on three levels: conceptually by the introduction of a richer set of epistemic concepts, both for the description of the system itself and for use in representation of common-sense patterns of reasoning within AE; logically by being closed under uniform substitution and being axiomatized entirely at the object-level; by an increased expressive power which enables the representation of a certain sort of prioritized normal defaults.
The paper is structured as follows. Basic syntax and semantics are presented in section 2; soundness, completeness, the finite model property and decidability are established by means of techniques which are standard in modal logic. Section 3 contains a philosophical interpretation of the main notions underlying the formal semantics of AE, in particular the notions of belief, cobelief and degree of confidence. From section 4 onwards we continue on the assumption that the language is finite. Finite languages allow us to define a particular formula which we shall call "the logical space," the effect of which is to turn the necessity operator into a true representation of logical necessity with no ambiguity as to whether Boolean propositions are necessary, contingent or impossible. Finite languages also have the capacity to represent exact belief states in a form which permits reductions into an explicit and particularly salient form, a form which reflects its models transparently. This is the content of the Modal Reduction Theorem, the result which forms the center of this study. In section 4 we exploit the model theory of AE to give a semantical proof of the theorem.
In the rest of the paper we focus on computational aspects of the Modal Reduction Theorem. The first thing we show is that the logical space, the size of which is exponential in the number of propositional letters, can be implicitly defined and generated by means of meta-rules which generalize the special rule introduced by Levesque in his initial paper on "only knowing." In fact the propositional fragment of Levesque's logic is a special case of the system AE ρ introduced in section 5.1; more precisely it corresponds to adopting what we shall call the maximal logical space and having only one degree of confidence in the language. Just as in Levesque's system the proof checking problem for AE ρ is NP-complete (and not linear). Moreover, these logics are not closed under uniform substitution, a property which holds for AE and which traditionally has been used to distinguish a logic from a theory.
On the computational side there are, however, strong reasons for accepting AE ρ as it gives an economic representation of the logical space. The satisfiability 2/43 problem for Levesque's system is Σ p 2 -complete [17, 18] , the same as for AE ρ without confidence levels.
We finally identify a set of provable equivalences within AE and prove that they are sufficient for proving the Modal Reduction Theorem syntactically. The procedure is applied in section 6 to give an account of prioritized supernormal defaults within AE.
The Logic AE

Syntax
The object language contains a stock of propositional letters, the constants and ⊥, and connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃ and ≡. If Γ is a finite set of formulae, Γ ( Γ) is the conjunction (disjunction) of the elements of Γ in an arbitrary order. Modal operators are 2 (necessity) and modalities B k (belief) and C k (co-belief) for each k in a finite index set I partially ordered by a relation . A modal atom is a formula of the form B k ϕ, C k ϕ, or 2ϕ, and a modal literal is either a modal atom or its negation. We employ the following dual modalities: 3ϕ is ¬2¬ϕ (ϕ is possible), b k ϕ is ¬B k ¬ϕ (ϕ is compatible with belief at k), and c k is ¬C k ¬ϕ (ϕ is compatible with co-belief at k).
The intuitions behind the syntactical operators shall be addressed at length in section 3, but some explanation at this point facilitates the introduction of concepts that we shall use throughout the text. In short, 2 is intended to express personal necessities. We shall read the formula 2(ϕ ⊃ ψ) as ϕ entails ψ and say that ϕ is at least as strong as ψ. The formula 3ϕ ∧ 3¬ϕ expresses that ϕ is contingent. Despite the fact that 2 can easily be defined by means of the belief and co-belief operators we shall take it as primitive; this choice is made both to give the operator conceptual priority and to facilitate technical arguments.
The indices in I are intended to represent various degrees of confidence or conviction. B k ϕ expresses that ϕ is believed with degree of confidence k; C k ϕ expresses that ϕ is co-believed with degree of confidence k. In the following, we will sometimes abbreviate "degree of confidence" as doc and write that ϕ is believed at k when B k ϕ holds.
The belief and co-belief operators are complementary. C k ϕ expresses a notion of caution, and can generally be read as expressing that at most ¬ϕ is believed with degree of confidence k; or, what amounts to the same, that ¬ϕ is at least as strong as everything that is believed at k (see section 3.2 for a caveat 3/43 regarding this interpretation). The "all I know at k" expression O k ϕ is central; it abbreviates B k ϕ ∧ C k ¬ϕ, meaning that precisely ϕ is believed with doc k. Some syntactical concepts: A formula ϕ is completely modalized if every occurrence of a propositional letter is within the scope of a modal operator. It is purely Boolean if it contains no occurrences of modal operators. The propositional substitution operator [·/·] distributes over connectives and modalities in the obvious way. ϕ[ψ 1 /ψ 2 ] is ϕ with every subformula occurrence of ψ 1 substituted with ψ 2 . A tautology is a substitution instance of a formula valid in classical propositional logic (such as 2ϕ ⊃ 2ϕ); if ϕ is a tautology of propositional logic we shall write PL ϕ. The logic AE is defined as the least set that contains all tautologies, contains all instances of the following schemata for each k ∈ I:
and is closed under all instances of the rules:
P B and P C are the Persistence axioms for B and C respectively. We write ϕ if ϕ is a theorem of AE. If (ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n ) ⊃ ψ, we sometimes write ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ψ and refer to ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n as premises.
The logic of 2 is S5. To see this, note that the T scheme is an axiom, that we can combine axioms Def2, B 2 and C 2 to yield the 4-scheme 2ϕ ⊃ 22ϕ and that Def2, B 2 and C 2 yield the 5-scheme ¬2ϕ ⊃ 2¬2ϕ. Similarly, we can show that B k and C k are both K45.
Models
U is a non-empty set of points; U + and U − are functions which assign a subset of U to each index in I. U
V is a valuation function which assigns a subset of U to each propositional letter in the language. An AE-model is intended to represent a doxastic subject (cf. section 3). U is the universe of the subjectively possible states of affairs, i.e., the range of 4/43 states of affairs that the subject can conceive of. Equating possibility and conceivability, we occasionally refer to U as the space of conceivability. The subject has a belief state at each degree of confidence k, modeled by U For each k ∈ I, we require that
SU, named for subjective universe, expresses that the universe is just the set of points that are, for any given k, either plausible or implausible to the doxastic subject. While belief states may vary between degrees of confidence, the universe does not.
The more alternatives the subject can rule out, the stronger the belief state. We require that greater confidence is never accompanied by stronger belief:
The model is bisected if, for each k ∈ I,
This is not a model condition; not a property that is forced by the axiom system. However, we can force Bisection to be satisfied by syntactic means, as described in section 4.2.
The requirement SU is analogous to a principle of excluded middle in ensuring that every point is either plausible or implausible. Accordingly, when Bisection is satisfied the model satisfies a form of non-contradiction, in that no point is both plausible and implausible.
A satisfaction relation can be defined for each point x:
and as usual for Boolean connectives. A formula is satisfied in a model if it is true at one of its points. If M x ϕ for all x ∈ U we write M ϕ and say that ϕ is true in M. If ϕ is true in all models, we shall also write ϕ.
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Observe that all points in a model agree on the truth value of every completely modalized formula. Hence, for such formulae the notions of satisfiability and truth in a model coincide. This justifies use of the notation M ϕ whenever a completely modalized ϕ is satisfied in M .
It follows directly from the truth definition that a proposition is necessary if and only if it holds in all conceivable alternatives. We omit the easy proofs of the properties in the following lemma, in which we write ϕ for the truth set of ϕ in M : {x ∈ U | M x ϕ}.
Proof. By Lemma 1 (2) .
, respectively, and thus in either case we have
which is tautologically equivalent to the formula in the lemma.
The next lemma expresses simple reduction properties of nested occurrences of modalities.
Lemma 4. Any formula is equivalent to a formula without nested occurrences of modalities.
Proof. The lemma is trivial for formulae without nested modalities; for an induction on the length of formulae, suppose ϕ contains nested modalities. Then ϕ contains a modal atom β as a proper subformula. By Lemma 3, ϕ is equivalent to a Boolean combination of the shorter formulae ϕ[β/ ], ϕ[β/⊥] and β, and hence we are done by the induction hypothesis.
We shall say that formulae without nested occurrences of modalities are in normal form. Formulae in normal form that are not purely Boolean shall be 6/43 said to be of modal depth 1. (2) and Lemma 1(3) yield that ϕ k ⊆ ϕ i . But this clashes with the Persistence property and hence contradicts the assumption that M is a model. Theorem 6. AE is sound, i.e., ϕ implies ϕ for any ϕ.
Proof. By routine induction on the length of proofs.
Completeness and the finite model property
To facilitate the proofs of completeness and decidability we shall in this section introduce an alternative semantics for AE. The alternative interpretation is a standard relational semantics with a structure which directly reflects the axioms.
Let us say that a frame is a quadruple (W, E, R, S), where the universe W is non-empty, E is a binary relation over W , and R and S are functions which assign binary relations over W to each doc in I. R and S satisfy the following constraints:
As usual R k denotes R(k) and (x, y) ∈ X •Y iff there is a z such that xXz and zY y. Two of the eight instances of (f1) state that R k and S k are transitive, e.g. R k • R k ⊆ R k , while two of them state that they are Euclidean, e.g.
A relational model is a frame equipped with a valuation function V which assigns a subset of the universe to each propositional letter. A relational model M evaluates modal formulae by quantifying over R k and
Proof. Reflexivity is (f2). Transitivity: Let k by any index in I.
A cluster is an equivalence class of W modulo E. Let C be an E-cluster. We define the belief part with regard to k, C + k , and the co-belief part with regard
Conversely, assume yR k y. The assumption that x, y ∈ C implies, by (f2), that either xR k y or xS k y. In the latter case S k R k ⊆ R k gives xR k y; hence xR k y in any case. S k is treated symmetrically.
Clusters provide the link between the relational models in this section and the AE-models introduced in section 2.2.
Lemma 9. Each AE-model is isomorphic to a cluster in a relational model, and vice versa.
Proof. The construction of a relational model from an AE-model is straightforward and is left to the reader. Conversely, let C be a cluster in a relational model (W, E, R, S, V ) and let V C be a valuation function such that Isomorphy follows from lemma 8. To see that M is an AE-model, note that since R k ∪ S k is reflexive, either xR k x or xS k x. This shows that the SU condition is met. Persistence holds by (f4).
Lemma 9 justifies a technical focus on relational models as all results established on the basis of these models immediately transfer to AE-models (and hence to AE).
A set s of formulae is maximal if it is consistent, and every proper extension of it is inconsistent. Two maximal sets s and t agree on a formula ϕ if ϕ ∈ s iff ϕ ∈ t. Let U
Interpretation
This section is dedicated to the informal interpretation of AE, with an emphasis on models. For comparison, consider what we may call standard doxastic logic, the modal logic KD45 with a single belief operator B. AE differs from the standard in three main respects: It does not have a consistency (D) schema, it has an additional 'co-belief' modality C, and it introduces a set of degrees of confidence indexing the modalities.
Although "only knowing" logics are not a new idea (Levesque's pioneering paper [11] is fifteen years old at the time of writing), we believe there is still a place for a closer look at the conceptual framework and the proper interpretation of the doxastic language in B and C. Throughout this section, doc indexes will be suppressed where they are not subject of discussion.
A personal universe
The first word about AE models is that the universe U comprises every state of affairs that is conceivable to the implicit doxastic subject. Conceivability is here to be understood as the expression of "personal metaphysics": the subject's notion of what is necessarily the case, what it takes for granted, basic presuppositions, that which is beyond doubt. U is the range of worlds that the subject considers possible.
At each degree of confidence k, U + k defines a belief state, consisting of the doxastic alternatives, the points that are consistent with what is believed at k. It is natural to view the belief modality B as expressing that points are ruled out as implausible: Bϕ expresses that every point that has ¬ϕ true is ruled out. Cϕ, on the other hand, expresses that no point at which ¬ϕ is true is ruled out, that every ¬ϕ point is plausible.
The semantic constraint that U is non-empty implies that the truth axiom 2ϕ ⊃ ϕ is valid (what is necessary is true). We may interpret this as saying that the real state of affairs is conceivable. The real state of affairs is however not necessarily contained in U + k , and while it is never plausible for the subject that any of its beliefs is false, situations in which some are may still be conceivable; if so, then as implausible. In formal terms, while 3(
Where we draw the line between the necessary and the contingent is a matter of practical application. The minimal notion of metaphysics is easily identified: to count only logical truths as necessary. This requires a maximal universe, with every logically consistent proposition represented at some point. For a comprehensive metaphysics, U should be restricted so that no point validates anything the subject considers impossible. One case in point is the analytic relationships between concepts. There is a great difference between the belief that "cats are not made of stone" and a contingent belief such as "cats make ideal pets". Certainly, the fact that what is taken for granted varies from context to context is of considerable relevance to common-sense reasoning. It is therefore a notable feature of AE models that they can accommodate stricter notions of what is necessary than the logically true.
At most and O
In the literature on "at most" logics, from Levesque's [11] onwards, the focus has mainly been on applications of the O operator, with Oϕ expressing that precisely ϕ, i.e., ϕ, and at most ϕ, is believed. 'At most ϕ is believed' means that ϕ is at least as strong as the strongest believed proposition, and C¬ϕ has been, appropriately, taken to express this notion.
With AE, the situation is less straightforward. An 'at most' interpretation of C¬ϕ is supported by the observation that whenever C¬ϕ is true, the truth 11/43 set of ϕ is a subset of the belief state,
(
The lack of Bisection as a requirement for AE models means, however, that the converse does not hold, which implies that what is believed at most is only partly characterized by C formulae. While a set of C formulae can approximate the belief state, as evidenced by (1), in cases where the set of formulae has a model which is not bisected the approximation can never supply a complete characterization.
In a non-bisected model, U
is nonempty, a set of points that are both plausible and implausible, and the belief state does not properly complement the co-belief state. Every proposition ϕ whose truth set ϕ is a subset of U fig. 1 ) should be said to be believed 'at most'. (Too see this, note that if ϕ is a subset of U
Hence ϕ is at least as strong as the strongest believed proposition, which by definition means that at most ϕ is believed.) C¬ϕ will not hold in such a case. Furthermore, there is then no formula ψ such that Bψ ∧ C¬ψ (i.e., Oψ) is true.
U
It is clear that we cannot provide a full account of the meaning of Cϕ by means of the notion of belief 'at most' alone. For the purposes of providing an informal account of meaning, we shall associate the attitude of caution with co-belief, and hence with the set of implausible alternatives U − . Accordingly, let the notion of being skeptical apply to belief and the set of plausible alternatives U + . In a bisected model, caution and skepticism as employed here will be extensionally equivalent.
In order to find an interpretation of Cϕ that doesn't rely on belief 'at most', consider the roles of belief and co-belief in a model. According to the model definition, beliefs serve to exclude conceivable alternatives from the set of plausibles, while co-beliefs serve to exclude conceivable alternatives from the set of implausibles. The more a subject co-believes, the more cautious the subject is.
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We propose the following reading of Cϕ, for which to 'rule out' refers to rendering implausible.
Cϕ : Every alternative that caution permits to be ruled out has ϕ true.
To see why this is appropriate, consider again how a belief state is determined. The more the subject believes, the smaller is the set of plausible points. Each belief (in a contingent proposition) contributes to the approximation of the belief state by eliminating points from the set of plausible alternatives. With co-belief, the situation is inverted. The more is co-believed, the less is considered implausible. A maximally cautious co-believer will consider no alternative implausible, just as the maximally skeptical believer considers every alternative plausible. The adoption of a co-belief that ϕ amounts to an increase in caution: to excluding all non-ϕ points from the set of implausible alternatives.
A non-bisected model may be interpreted as a model of a subject that has a discrepancy between caution and belief; between caution to not accept evidence and actual acceptance. In a bisected model, however, there is a co-belief to match every belief; just the right amount of caution to match what is believed.
Only when we have a bisected model is it appropriate to say that co-belief determines the belief state U Non-bisected models have a potential for representing a subtle form of doxastic underdetermination. Nevertheless, we will in the remainder of this section work under the presupposition that models are in fact bisected.
B and C
How does the language of AE expand on the traditional doxastic language in B, and how are the additional modalities that AE provides related? Let us begin by pointing out what B and b, which have a standard definition in AE, mean. Bϕ is a general and positive belief modality, expressing that every conceivable alternative at which ϕ is false is implausible; bϕ is a particular and negative modality that says some alternative at which ϕ is true is plausible. Thus, Bϕ expresses belief (in a weak sense, knowledge) while bϕ expresses non-belief (in a weak sense, ignorance).
In AE, the language is enriched with a general and negative modality C, and a particular and positive modality c. Figure 2 relates the simple modalities 13/43 in a design analogous to a traditional "square of oppositions", where arrows express implication and lines without arrowheads express contradiction. Different styles of line correspond to preconditions. Whole lines illustrate unconditional relationships, dashed lines apply only given a consistent belief state, and dotted lines apply only if ϕ is contingent. The positive (knowledge) modalities have been placed in the rear corners of the cube, negative (ignorance) modalities in front.
bϕ b¬ϕ c¬ϕ cϕLet a doxastic attitude toward a proposition be the attitude of belief, disbelief, undecidedness, and so forth as given by a model. The addition of C to the doxastic language in B expands the range of doxastic attitudes that we can express. For illustration, consider the following as examples of propositions that a doxastic subject can relate to.
ϕ : "David Beckham hates public attention" ψ : "David Beckham is a cat" χ : "David Beckham is a cat and David Beckham is not a cat" ϕ is generally believed to be false, but could conceivably be true (the popular image of Mr. Beckham may well be misleading). Barring extreme skepticism, ψ is an impossibility, although not a logical impossibility by most standards. χ is a logical impossibility according to any relevant standard. These are distinctions that are readily grasped, and it is desirable that a doxastic language should be able to express them.
Using C and B together, we can distinguish belief in propositions that the subject takes to be necessarily true from belief in contingent propositions. ϕ is an example of a proposition that is believed to be false, although it is perfectly possible to imagine a world in which it is true; this doxastic attitude is captured in formula (2) .
For any proposition ψ that is considered impossible, we can make use of the 14/43 following representation.
is by definition equivalent to 2¬ψ -"ψ is impossible". Semantically, B¬ψ expresses that no alternative that has ψ true is plausible, while C¬ψ says that no alternative with ψ true is implausible; by (SU), then, there can be no alternative in which ψ is true.
The C operator enables us to express the distinction between belief in necessities and belief in contingent propositions. It might also be useful to be able to distinguish "metaphysical" from logical necessity, such as with χ above, but this desideratum is not fulfilled. We can not distinguish, by AE expressions, non-belief due to metaphysical impossibility from non-belief due to logical impossibility. (We do however provide an axiomatic method for specifying what is necessary and what is contingent, in section 4.)
The attitude expressed by Bϕ is often called "knowledge". The lack of a T schema for B implies, however, that AE should be seen as a logic of belief only, as the notion of knowledge clearly requires that what is known is also true.
1
A similar consideration applies to calling C an "ignorance" operator: only part of what goes by the name of ignorance is captured by expressions such as Cϕ. Knowledge and ignorance are on a par in presupposing a notion of correctness that is not required for simple belief. Two prominent cases of ignorance are, to believe ϕ while ϕ is false, and to not believe ϕ while ϕ is true. The truth value of ϕ is essential to both variants.
Because it does satisfy the truth axiom, 2 may be considered a candidate for a knowledge operator in AE. However, because 2 also satisfies the negative introspection schema 5, it is arguably too strong for a proper knowledge operator (see [10] , p. 79).
Doxastic positions
Expressions of doxastic attitude toward a proposition can be more or less precise. For instance, an expression of belief Bϕ can be specified further by 1 The reader may well find this comment uncongenial to what is implied by the title of this paper, namely, that AE should be a logic of knowledge. Our choice of title was dictated by the standard naming practice for "at most" logics. Perhaps in favor of this practice, observe that the notion of belief expressed by Bϕ is clearly stronger than the commonsensical use of the term "belief", in expressing a notion of conviction that ϕ is true, and not a weaker attitude that ϕ is, e.g., more likely to be true than non-ϕ. The common association of Bϕ with knowledge that ϕ may be by analogy to the strong connection between having a belief and possessing evidence for that belief, which amounts to having learned that ϕ is true.
combining it with bϕ, to express that ϕ is consistently believed, or with C¬ϕ to say that precisely ϕ is believed.
Referring to figure 2, we see that there are four consistent pairs of modal literals for each of B and C, the pairs linked by horizontal edges of the cube. Each pair corresponds to a distinct doxastic attitude toward the subject proposition, and each pair of formulae expresses this doxastic attitude as precisely as can be done using the respective operator. Forming conjunctions of each pair (for B and C, respectively), we obtain a set of consistent and mutually exclusive formulae, the disjunction of which is a tautology. We will refer to members of such a set of formulae as doxastic positions. 2 A set of doxastic positions corresponds to the range of doxastic attitudes that can be distinguished by means of the respective operator. It is therefore useful for the purpose of describing the expressive power of the doxastic language.
The sets of doxastic positions for B and C are shown in figure 3 , ordered by weakness of belief state. Labels t, l, r, and b stand for "top", "left", "right", and "bottom". The top positions are expressions of lack of belief, of weakness of the belief state. For B, the t position expresses undecidedness with regard to ϕ. The t position for C expresses maximal weakness of belief, that no contingent proposition is believed. Employing a useful analogy, we may say that C⊥ is true when the "database" of beliefs is empty. The b positions are the strongest expressions of belief. For B, the b position corresponds to inconsistent belief (every proposition is believed). The b position for C says that there are some ϕ alternatives as well as some non-ϕ alternatives among those that are inconsistent with what is believed. The l and r positions are intermediate with regard to strength of the belief state. For B, position l represents the attitude of consistent belief that ϕ. For C, the l position expresses that at most ϕ is believed, that nothing is believed that is stronger than ϕ (C¬ϕ), while ¬ϕ holds in some alternative that is incompatible with what is believed; i.e., that the database is not empty.
We now look at the possible combinations of B and C positions, in order to see what C adds to the language with just B with regard to a finer partitioning of the range of expressible attitudes.
Forming conjunctions of the B and C positions of figure 3, we find that 15 of 16 conjunctions are consistent; the exception is B⊥ ∧ C⊥ (implying ⊥ by axiom schemata Def2 and T ). This set of doxastic positions is presented in figure 4 .
2 The treatment here is inspired by the theory of normative positions in deontic and action logic, in particular [20] , which see for a formal framework and references. Little has been published regarding doxastic positions. The first use of the term may be in [15] .
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r r r r r r r r r r Explanations of what is expressed by each position follow. We will occasionally draw on the natural analogy between belief states and databases.
tt, lt, rt. These positions express that the subject has no contingent belief -that the database is empty. The positions differ only with regard to the modality of ϕ. lt expresses that ϕ is a necessity; rt, that it is an impossibility. While the positions will typically express a lack of belief, only the position tt necessarily implies a degree of ignorance. The exception obtains when every truth is necessary according to the subject's metaphysics, hence also believed. Such a subject has perfect belief. lt or rt will then properly express the belief state, depending on whether ϕ is true in the single conceivable alternative or not.
br, bb, bl. These positions all represent an inconsistent belief state, and differ only in the modality assigned to ϕ, accordingly as in lt, tt, rt.
tl. For this position, C¬ϕ expresses that the subject believes at most ϕ, meaning that every ϕ-compatible proposition is plausible. From b¬ϕ, we see that the position is consistent, while c¬ϕ informs us that the database is not empty, and ϕ is contingent: some (¬ϕ) alternatives are not plausible. The conjunction C¬ϕ ∧ b¬ϕ may be interpreted as saying that less than ϕ is ll. In this position, precisely ϕ is believed. All and only the alternatives that have ϕ true are plausible.
tb. This position corresponds well with the common-sense notion of suspension of judgment with regard to ϕ. ϕ is believed neither true nor false (bϕ ∧ b¬ϕ). Furthermore, the database is not empty: some ϕ-as well as some ¬ϕ-alternatives are implausible.
lb. This position is the best candidate for expressing the default, commonsense notion that ϕ is believed. ϕ, and more (cϕ), is believed, and the belief state is consistent (bϕ).
lr. For this position, Bϕ and Cϕ combine to express that ϕ is necessary. bϕ ensures that belief is consistent, and cϕ that the database is not empty.
(The positions tr., rr., and rb. differ from tl., ll., and lb. only with respect to the negation of ϕ.)
Given that I is non-singleton Persistence implies that the subject's attitude 18/43 toward a proposition ϕ -the doxastic position of the subject with regard to ϕ -can only remain unchanged or get stronger as degree of confidence is lowered. The ordering of nodes in figure 4 therefore corresponds to possible changes of doxastic attitude towards ϕ from doc i to a lesser doc j.
Degrees of confidence
We now consider the question, to what extent does AE provide an appropriate framework for representing the common-sense notion of degrees of confidence? With AE, the set of degrees of confidence I is ordered by the relation of conviction ≺, and i ≺ j is intended to mean that i is at least as great a doc as j.
The direction of the partial order relation ≺ deserves a comment. Following most authors in the field we write i ≺ k to denote that i is at least as great a degree of confidence as k. Persistence implies that the belief state corresponding to k is at least as strong as the belief state corresponding to i when i ≺ k, a perspective which justifies the direction of the sign. There is an intrinsic tension in the use of the symbol because we want it to reflect that in general, lesser degrees of confidence are accompanied by increase in strength of the belief state. The direction of the sign necessarily has to reflect one and only one of these perspectives.
In practical application, the degrees of confidence we acknowledge, and the relations between them, vary widely with the situation. On the roughest possible approach, only one degree of confidence is recognized. This means we don't distinguish the reliability of mathematical beliefs from the reliability of beliefs based on hearsay. When we do make a distinction, a common approach is to recognize two degrees of confidence, one for beliefs based on empirical evidence and another, greater, degree to beliefs based on a priori insights. We can go on to make arbitrarily fine-grained distinctions; indeed, it may be possible to argue that every belief should be assigned its own separate degree of confidence.
Finding an appropriate resolution is a pragmatic, application-dependent issue.
There is little reason, in general, to expect that a relation of degrees of confidence will be linear. Beliefs typically come with different degrees of confidence because the sources of the evidence upon which the beliefs are based vary with regard to their reliability. Just as it may be difficult to compare the reliability of sources, it may be difficult or impossible to determine which of two degrees of confidence should be considered greater. This yields the following explanations of b k ϕ and C k ϕ, emphasizing that they express lack of belief.
that ¬ϕ is compatible with a falsity.
Persistence applies to positive belief modalities only. b and C are expressions that there is no belief -hence, no belief to be preserved either.
It is difficult to account for the origin and character of degrees of confidence using only the notions of belief states and persistence. Intuitively, we prefer to consider belief states at varying doc's as outcomes, as consequences of evidence processing that is sensitive to distinctions between more, and less, reliable sources of evidence. Degrees of confidence apply in the first instance to evidence, the "input", and only derivatively to belief, the outcome of a process that merges the input with antecedent doxastic attitudes. It is for instance insufficient to say that what is believed at priority i stems from a source (sources) of evidence whose reliability matches i, because what is believed at doc i depends not only on the evidence that is i-quality, but essentially also on whether that evidence is compatible with evidence that is more reliable than i. What is believed at priority i is typically only a subset of the evidence that has priority i. On this view, the property of Persistence should be understood on the basis of evidence priorities, and not as a principle of belief priorities. It is improper to say, for instance, that belief at doc j is "carried over" to a lesser doc i. The property of persistence is valid for belief at degrees of confidence as a consequence of the processing of prioritized evidence into prioritized beliefs. It does not reflect a property of beliefs per se.
The reasoning that shows why persistence should be considered valid on the basis of the structure of evidence uptake can be applied to motivate, also, that
should be a valid principle. Prudence is a consistency requirement that may be an attractive addition to AE in applications. It expresses that what is believed at a lower doc must still be an option at every greater doc. In terms of models, this implies that the belief state should never be allowed to become empty.
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Due to contraposition, Prudence implies that
and hence also a "local" consistency schema,
This implies b i for any doc i. C i ¬⊥ is always true, so Prudence implies that C i ¬⊥ ∧ b i ¬⊥ holds, that less than ⊥ is believed.
The consistency expressed in Prudence could not be captured with just the C operator. We express consistency of belief, in general, by using b; there is no means of expressing consistency with C or c, with the exception of the indiscriminate C .
AE has two complementary axioms governing persistence, P B and P C . While P B expresses that belief is preserved into lesser doc's, P C expresses that caution is preserved into greater doc's. A principle expressed with C and c relating to Prudence like P C relates to P B would be
This implies that some point is always implausible -that the database is never entirely empty.
Persistence ensures that belief states are never weakened as doc is lowered. We could also consider a stronger property: that a decrease in doc should always be accompanied by a genuine increase in strength of the belief state. This would ensure validity of the following principle.
There are many interesting representations that fail to satisfy Progress (including the example of section 6, which does however satisfy Prudence). Degrees of confidence typically correspond to which sources have been listened to, which default rules have been applied, which pieces of information have been taken into account, and so forth. A doc i can be considered a record of the extent of processing that went into forming the belief state at i: the more evidence is taken into account, the lesser the doc to accompany resultant belief. There is in general nothing exceptional if the consideration of further evidence fails to strengthen the belief state. Further evidence may be unacceptable because it is overridden by evidence that carries more weight.
Where k is ≺-minimal, and unique, it is natural to understand B k as a modality of full conviction. The following dialog demonstrates that acknowledging non-unique maximal doc's is counterintuitive.
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-Do you believe ϕ? -Yes I do, with a maximal amount of conviction.
-So you don't believe ¬ϕ, then? -Oh, I do! In fact, there is nothing I believe with a greater degree of confidence.
We can hardly make sense of this conversation unless we interpret the respondent as expressing an inconsistent doxastic attitude toward ϕ. It demonstrates that only maximal and unique elements of I can be adequately interpreted as representing the common-sense notion of a "maximal degree of confidence".
In applications, it may be natural to require that only necessities are believed with maximal doc. We may assign a designated index 2 for the maximal doc, and require that O 2 ϕ ≡ 2ϕ, i.e., O 2 . In the same vein, minimal confidence could be associated with believing ⊥.
It is worth pointing out that whenever a doxastic subject with doc's reports a belief that ϕ, the belief should be reported as being believed with the strongest doc at which ϕ is believed. (For instance, say there is a degree of conviction i to match what is reported in today's newspaper. While it is reasonable to say that 2 + 2 = 4 is believed at i, it would be misleading not to report that this is a belief that is accompanied by a maximal doc.) This may be considered a requirement along the lines of a Gricean maxim to be as informative as possible.
Logical Spaces and Belief State Representations for Finite Languages
The point of a logical space is to mirror the notion of personal metaphysics introduced in sections 2.2 and 3.1. Recall that in the Beckham example (page 14), χ can never be appropriately represented as contingent, while with ψ we have a choice of specifying it as contingent, necessary, or impossible. This can be achieved by means of different logical spaces. We can also, e.g., define a logical space λ such that λ 2(penguin(Tweety) ⊃ bird(Tweety)) and thereby syntactically express a constraint on conceivability. We may, of course, state this conditional as part of the agent's beliefs, but conceptually analytic statements are expressed in a better way at the level of necessity.
In terms of model theory a logical space corresponds to, and represents, the conceivability space U . U + and U − are mirrored by formal expressions which we shall call belief state representations. They can be provided in an explicit form, from which a model can be directly determined, or in an implicit form which neither needs to have a unique model nor promises a quick way in which 22/43 they can be determined. The deep content of the Modal Reduction Theorem is that any implicit representation can be brought to an equivalent form as a disjunction of explicit representations, a form which unambiguously exhibits all its models.
Logical Spaces
We will in the rest of this paper assume that the language has finitely many propositional letters; assume they are p 1 , . . . , p n (in this fixed order). Let us say that an atom is a conjunction ±p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ±p n where ±p i means either p i or ¬p i . An atom is the syntactical counterpart to a point, characterizing the material content of a state of affairs, i.e. the "external world", neglecting the agent's cognitive state. Note that any two distinct atoms are inconsistent with each other and that the disjunction of all atoms is a tautology.
A purely Boolean formula ϕ determines a unique set ϕ of the atoms that imply ϕ. Note that ϕ is a full DNF equivalent of ϕ. The following properties are immediate.
Lemma 15. Let ϕ and ψ be purely Boolean and α be an atom.
(1) α ϕ or α ¬ϕ,
Let Γ be a non-empty set of atoms; note that Γ has at most 2 n elements. The logical space spanned by Γ is defined as
where 3Γ = {3ϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ} (and similarly for 2). If Γ is the set of all atoms, λ(Γ) is denoted λ and is called the maximal logical space. We shall in the following use the symbol λ to denote an arbitrary logical space.
Lemma 16. Let Γ be a non-empty set of atoms and M λ(Γ). Then, for each atom α, α ∈ Γ iff α is true at some point in M .
Proof. Note that α is true at some point in M iff 3α is a conjunct of λ(Γ), iff α ∈ Γ.
Any point in a model satisfies one and only one atom. Since the language is finite we can, for each point x ∈ U , define the corresponding atom x in a straightforward way: x is the conjunction of the propositional letters with each p i negated iff false at x.
Lemma 17. Let ϕ be purely Boolean and M be a model.
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Proof. (1) follows directly from Lemma 15(1). For (2), note that x ϕ iff x ∈ ϕ (by definition). Also note that since M λ(Γ), M Γ; hence x ∈ Γ for each x. Thus, x ∈ ||ϕ|| iff x ∈ ϕ and x ∈ Γ. If an explicit bsr λ ∧ ψ I is satisfiable, it has essentially only one model; moreover, this model can easily be defined from the formula itself. Otherwise, λ∧ψ I is inconsistent due to a clash with the persistence axioms. These observations are made precise in the next lemma, which assumes that ψ I is k∈I O k ϕ k and λ is spanned by Γ. Let us, to this end, say that two models are modally equivalent if they agree on the truth value of all modal atoms. . Accordingly the theorem tells us exactly which models the formula has up to modal equivalence.
Explicit and Implicit Belief State Representations
Lemma 19. Let λ ∧ ψ I be an explicit bst. Then (1) all models of λ ∧ ψ I are modally equivalent, (2) λ ∧ ψ I is consistent iff Γ ∩ ϕ k ⊆ ϕ i for each i k, (3) either λ ∧ ψ I ϕ or λ ∧ ψ I ¬ϕ for each completely modalized ϕ. Proof. (1): Let M = (U, U + , U − , V ) and assume that M λ ∧ ψ I . By Lemma 16, Γ = { x | x ∈ U }. For each doc k, M partitions Γ into Γ + k = { x | x ∈ U + k } and Γ − k = { x | x ∈ U − k }.
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A semantic proof of the Modal Reduction Theorem
The idea behind the semantical proof of the Modal Reduction Theorem is to encode part of the semantics into the syntax. Technically we shall work with the filtration of the canonical model, and the argument rests essentially of a sufficiently rich filtration set. More precisely, we define a molecule as a disjunction of atoms; since there are 2 n distinct atoms in our finite language, there are 2 2 n non-equivalent molecules. By convention ⊥ is the disjunction of the empty set of atoms and is hence a molecule. The filtration set Σ which underlies the constructions in this section is the least set of formulae which is closed under subformulae and the following two constraints for each doc k :
if α is an atom, then both b k α, c k α and 3α are in Σ, if µ is a molecule, then both B k µ, C k µ and 2µ are in Σ.
By construction Σ is ≺-closed, and it is hence a filtration set. M † , the filtration of the canonical model wrt. Σ, is defined as in section 2.3. In the rest of the section all references to semantical constructions are relative to this model.
We first define a syntactical representation of a set of points in
M † . If X is a set of points, [[X]] is defined by {[[x]] | x ∈ X}.
Lemma 21. Let X and Y be subsets of a cluster C (in M †
).
Proof. To see the non-trivial direction of (1), note that for two points x, y ∈ C,
] iff x = y. This is because two different points must disagree on a formula in the filtration set. Since x and y belong to the same cluster, they agree on every modal atom and must hence disagree on a propositional letter. 
We say that β + k (C) is the belief formula of C wrt. k and β − k (C) the co-belief formula of C wrt. k. λ(C) denotes the logical space spanned by the set of atoms true at a point in C.
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Lemma 22. Let C be a cluster and ϕ be purely Boolean. Then
Proof. We will only prove the first, since the proof of the latter is symmetrical.
Lemma 23. Each cluster C is uniquely characterized by β
Proof. Let D be a cluster distinct from C. Then C and D must, by construction of M † , disagree on a formula in Σ of the form B k ϕ or C k ϕ. The case where the two clusters disagree on a formula C k ϕ is symmetric to the case where they disagree on a formula B k ϕ, so we will only treat the B k -modality.
Lemma 24. Let C be bisected. Then β
Proof. We have to establish four distinct theorems of AE.
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We 
Computational aspects
The size of the logical space is clearly exponential in the number of propositional variables. Explicitly specifying the logical space can, however, be avoided by using a purely Boolean formula as a basis for an implicit generation of the logical space. This is addressed in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2 and 5.3 we once again address the Modal Reduction Theorem, but this time from a syntactical and constructive point of view. More precisely we show how an explicit representation can be obtained from an implicit one by a series of equivalence-preserving rewriting operations. In Section 5.4 we address the computational complexity of the procedure.
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The system AE ρ
Let ρ be any consistent purely Boolean formula. The system AE ρ extends AE by the following axiom and inference rule (for purely Boolean ϕ) to AE:
We shall use ρ to denote the deducibility relation of AE ρ . The formula ρ is called the characteristic formula of the system AE ρ .
By means of RI and RC, a characteristic formula gives rise to a unique logical space. As an example, let ρ be p ≡ q. Since ρ ≡ (¬p ∧ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q) we can derive the following:
It is easy to see that
Theorem 25. Let ρ be a consistent purely Boolean formula and ϕ any formula. Then λ( ρ) ϕ iff ρ ϕ.
Proof. Only if:
Assume λ ϕ. For each α ∈ ρ RC gives ρ 3α. ρ 2ρ is the RI axiom. Since ρ ≡ ρ, Lemma 1(4) gives ρ λ. If: We show by induction on the proofs of AE ρ that ρ ϕ implies λ ϕ. Any axiom of AE ρ is an axiom of AE, hence the result holds in the basis. There are four induction steps, corresponding to the rules of AE ρ . RI: We have to establish λ 2ρ, which follows directly from ρ ≡ ρ. RC: If ρ, ψ PL ⊥, i.e., ρ PL ¬ψ, there must also be an atom α ∈ ρ such that α PL ψ. To see this, assume the contrary. Then each atom in ρ implies ¬ψ by Lemma 15(1). Hence ρ ¬ψ. Substitution of equivalents yields ρ ¬ψ, contradicting a previous conclusion. Hence there must exists an α such that α PL ψ, thus 3α 3ψ and, consequently, λ 3ψ. MP: If ρ ψ was derived from ρ ϕ ⊃ ψ and ρ ϕ, then λ ϕ ⊃ ψ and λ ϕ by the induction hypothesis, and hence λ ψ. RN: If ρ 2ϕ was derived from ρ ϕ, then λ ϕ by the induction hypothesis, hence 2λ 2ϕ. As λ is completely modalized, λ 2ϕ follows.
The validity of certain implications can be carried out completely within propositional logic by using the characteristic formula ρ instead of λ.
Lemma 26. For any purely Boolean ϕ, ψ and ρ:
Proof. We prove the first and leave the others to the reader. The "if" direction follows by standard modal logic. Conversely, assume that
Lemma 27. Let i k. For any purely Boolean ϕ, ψ and ρ:
Rewriting rules
Generating the λ-expansions of an O I -block can be done by rewriting it using provable equivalences within the logic. The formula is first expanded, then collapsed.
To apply the expand rule one must select a modal atom β of modal depth 1 and substitute it with and ⊥ in the following way:
The soundness of this rule follows immediately from Lemma 3. After using the expand rule, one may apply the collapse rules. In the rules below, all occurrences of ϕ and ψ are propositional and i k. The collapse rules pertaining to B-formulae are:
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to C-formulae:
and to 2-formulae:
As shown below, the rules are sound. They are not complete, as distribution and simplification rules are required. This, however, is outside the scope of the present article.
Lemma 28. The collapse rules are sound.
and B
2
we need to show that
They are both equivalent to " we need to show that we need to show that
They are both equivalent to "λ ∧ O i ϕ ¬2ψ if ρ ψ", whose contraposition by Lemma 19(3) , is "ρ ψ if λ∧O i ϕ 2ψ", which again follows from Lemma 26. 
A syntactic proof of the Modal Reduction Theorem
. Hence both σ and τ contain a binding for B k (ψ[σ 0 ]) to the right of the respective initial segments σ 0 and τ 0 . As both bindings occur in V and V is a modal valuation, the two bindings are identical.
A modal valuation V is said to be a modal valuation of ϕ if ϕ[σ] is purely Boolean for some sequence σ of bindings from V . The above lemma says that this value is independent of the particular σ, provided σ contains sufficiently many bindings to make the result purely Boolean. Hence we shall be permitted to write ϕ[V ] for this unique purely Boolean formula when V is a modal valuation of ϕ.
Note that two distinct modal valuations may produce the same formula, i.e., both
Let V be a modal valuation; the following function is useful.
Thus φ(V ) is equivalent to a conjunction of the modal atoms in the bindings in V , negated if bound to ⊥. A modal valuation of ϕ is minimal if no proper subset is a modal valuation of ϕ; we write M (ϕ) for the set of minimal modal valuations of ϕ. By mod(ϕ) we denote the set of modal atoms (of any depth) occurring in ϕ. 
Proof. By the preceding lemma we have
, and by repeated applications of Lemma 1 (4) 
confidence level. This is well-known material; however, the example illustrates features of AE and motivates Section 6.2. In that section we enrich the default representation with priorities, the function of which is to constrain the order in which defaults are tested. This is achieved in AE by exploiting confidence levels and the underlying persistence property. The proof of the adequacy of the representation also serves to illustrate the algorithm addressed in the previous section.
The results that we obtain for prioritized theories extend and deepen the early attempt of Konolige [8] to represent such reasoning within autoepistemic logic. Compared to a full account of prioritized unrestricted defaults (see [1, 3] ) the case of supernormal defaults is much simpler.
Default conditionals without priorities
Assume a finite set D of default names and a function ϕ which assigns a purely Boolean formula to each element in D. As usual we write ϕ a for ϕ(a).
We shall first represent the default theory which consists of supernormal defaults with consequent ϕ(a), for all a ∈ D. To this end we let the index set I consist of a single doc and let ≺ be empty. The property corresponding to the statement "the proposition ϕ holds by default" is formalized by the formula bϕ ⊃ ϕ within the scope of the O-modality. We will refer to this formula as a default conditional when it occurs within the modal O-context. The purpose of the following function is to individuate default conditionals:
Note that δ(a) is equivalent to ¬ϕ a ⊃ B¬ϕ a , i.e., should ϕ be false, the subject will believe that it is.
We shall illustrate this default representation by means of an example inspired by Reiter [16, Example 2.1].
A novel point in AE is that we can select different, and illuminating, characteristic formulae to span the logical space, and thereby characterize the joint impact that the logical space and the "knowledge base" κ have on the evaluation of defaults. Below we define four distinct logical spaces 36/43 and draw some consequences of relevance for the default representation.
Noticing the pattern for ρ 1 and ρ 2 the reader will easily figure out entailed possibilities in the latter two cases as well (and not mere impossibilities). A crucial point in the AE approach to default representation is that the 3 operator serves the function of an operator for logical possibility. It can serve this function precisely because the logical space formalizes the notion of logical necessity. The b operator similarly formalizes the notion of being consistent with what is believed, which lies at the heart of the formal rendition of defaults by means of default conditionals.
Another central point in AE is that the evaluation of defaults is carried out within the logic itself in the form of provable equivalents. In this example the reduction to explicit belief representations are reflected in the following theorems of AE.
Recalling the definition of λ-expansion from section 4.2 we see that there are exactly two distinct expansions for λ(ρ 4 ). For the maximal logical space this notion corresponds exactly to the notion of a stable expansion in autoepistemic logic, cf. [11] . The fact that the O operator permits us to characterize the belief state precisely is essential for the provability of the equivalences.
Conceptually there is an important difference in the way that defaults are treated in AE (and in autoepistemic approaches in general) and in Reiter-style default logics. To use a conditional for the representation of a default means to state an invariant of a belief set. It is equivalences like those above which demonstrate that adoption of such conditionals gives the belief set a behavior which matches intuitions behind default rules. The AE representation provides a denotational representation of defaults while Reiter provides an operational account.
The belief set in the example above is characterized by a simultaneous belief in different default conditionals. In consequence there is no way of resolving conflicts. This is the subject of the next section.
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Prioritizing supernormal defaults
Let < be a strict partial order on D. The intuition is that if a < b, then default a has to be applied before default b. To capture this let an application sequence be a finite string over D without repetition of symbols. The concatenation of s and t is denoted st. The empty sequence is denoted ε. It has length 0 and is the identity element wrt. concatenation. The prefix order is defined as s st, where s and t are any application sequences (including ε). ↓t denotes {s | s t}. The precedence set over P = (D, <) is defined as the least set T P such that
(1) ε ∈ T P , and (2) tb ∈ T P if t ∈ T P , b does not occur in t, and every a such that a < b occurs in t.
The following observation is easy to prove. We want to show that these simple concepts provide us with a constructive way of analyzing the generation process of extensions. The following example depicts the graphical structure we obtain from the topologically sorted strings.
Example 37. Let D be as in Example 35, and assume that the extension of the < order is b < a and b < c. Let P be (D, <). The corresponding precedence tree is depicted as solid lines in Figure 5 . Dotted lines indicate branches in the tree with an empty order relation; application sequences along dotted lines clash with the <-relation of this example. Let us now address the assignment of propositional content to the nodes in the tree. A subtle technical detail to this end is that we shall have to alter 38/43 the definition of a default conditional and say that a default conditional is a formula b i ϕ ⊃ ϕ which occurs within the scope of an O k -modality such that i k. The key lemma follows. ∧ i k (b i ϕ i ⊃ ϕ i ) ) has a unique λ-expansion.
Proof. Say that J ⊆ I is closed if i ∈ J whenever i k and k ∈ J. Now writing ζ k for (κ ∧ i k (b i ϕ i ⊃ ϕ i )), we show that for each closed J ⊆ I there will be some modal valuation V of k∈J B k ¬ϕ k such that The proof is by induction on J. It is trivial for empty J, as k∈∅ ζ k ≡ φ(∅) ≡ . For the induction step, suppose J is non-empty; then J = J 0 ∪ {j} for some j, J 0 such that j k for no k ∈ J 0 . J 0 is closed since J is, hence by the induction hypothesis there is a modal valuation V 0 of k∈J 0 B k ¬ϕ k such that 
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Putting this together, we see that the following are all equivalent given λ.
. Thus the first and two last of the above can be identified as the three formulae that were to be shown equivalent given λ.
Let us now address the encoding of the prioritized default theory in AE. The idea is to use T P as the index set I in the signature of AE and use the prefix ordering to distinguish degrees of confidence. When we interpret modalities as application sequences we employ them as devices for protecting information. We extend the δ function in an interesting way:
Note that it is the last term in the application sequence which selects the particular ϕ, while the modal context of the consistency check is given by the whole term.
On the basis of Lemma 38 we propose the following representation of the prioritized default theory P = (D, <) with assignment function ϕ. P, κ ε = O ε κ P, κ sa = O sa (κ ∧ tb∈↓sa δ(tb)) P, κ = t∈T P P, κ t Theorem 39. P, κ has a unique λ-expansion.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 38 when we use T P as index set I, put ϕ sa = ϕ ta if sa and ta are both in T P , and put ϕ = .
The maximal nodes in the unique λ-expansion of (D, <), κ play a central role as they correspond to the "final" beliefs up to <. We close the article by addressing our example once again.
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Example 40. Continuing Example 37 we note that P, κ is
which has the unique λ(ρ 4 )-expansion
History and Future Work
The present work extends the conference paper [13] . It was initiated by the first author's doctoral thesis [21] , in which the Modal Reduction Theorem for the system AE was first established. The theorem for Levesque's system has later been discovered independently by Levesque and Lakemeyer and appears as Corollary 9.5.6 in [12] ; their proof is similar in style to the proof here but with a less general transformation strategy. The construction in the semantical proof of the Modal Reduction Theorem is inspired by a note of Segerberg [19] written in response to [21] .
In the language of AE formulated in this paper, it is not possible to express properties about indices in I or about the preference relation ≺ within the language. It would be interesting to see whether the techniques of term-modal logics [4] can be applied also to AE, possibly with a cautious introduction of quantifiers. If the language is extended to decidable fragments of first-order logic, it can presumably still be used to represent defaults along the lines sketched in this paper. The point is that the term universe must be finite. We must also restrict the language to formulae in Σ 1 0 , like 3∃x bird(x), and formulae in Π 1 0 like 2∀x(penguin(x) ⊃ bird(x)). Such formulae do not generate new terms and hence reduce to purely Boolean logic. In this way the system can be extended to restricted fragments of first-order logic which nevertheless are sufficient for describing a number of common-sense situations. Of course, if we extend the language to full first-order logic, the system can no longer be used to represent default reasoning along the lines sketched in this paper. In general it will then impossible be to represent the space of conceivability with a finite formula. In fact such systems suffer from a fundamental incompleteness property [7] .
